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The United Nations and Human Security
S. Neil MacFarlane
This article discusses the role of the United Nations in the development of the 
concept of human security since the 1998 Lysøen Declaration. The UN’s role in the 
evolution of understandings of human security in international society is examined, 
emphasizing conceptual development, the incubation of ideas, consensus building, 
legitimation and codification, and practice. It also considers the limitations on the 
organization in promoting human security, given its state-centric character and 
substantial contestation of the idea of sovereignty in international society. The 
analysis suggests that the organization has played a significant role in the effort to 
define, promote, legitimize and implement elements of human security, but faces 
serious constraints given its state-centric nature.
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Introduction
This article discusses the role of the United Nations in the evolution of the human 
security agenda in the 15 years since the Lysøen Declaration, issued in May 1998. 
The subject remains topical, not least in view of the UN’s difficulty in addressing 
key challenges to human security. These include whether the international 
organization should, or can, mandate international action to halt the killing of 
civilians and other crimes against humanity, such as the use of chemical weapons 
in Syria.
The analysis suggests that the organization has played an important role 
in conceiving human security and advocating normative change around the 
concept. It has also provided a universal forum for its elaboration and a means 
for its partial legitimation. The organization has also facilitated the embedding of 
elements of the human security agenda in law, institutions, and practice. In this 
respect, the analysis speaks to a number of important themes in the literature on 
normative change. However, the state-centric quality of the UN, the process of 
decision making in the Security Council, and remaining commitments to norms 
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of sovereignty and non-intervention among member states have hampered efforts 
to embed human security at the UN and in international relations more broadly. 
Furthermore, I argue that the UN and its agencies should be seen as one 
set of actors in a complex constellation of individual leaders, governments, 
nongovernmental organizations, and regional and global multilateral institutions 
engaged to varying degrees and at various times in promotion of aspects of the 
agenda. The focus here on the UN should not be taken as under-appreciation of 
the importance of these other sets of actors. The UN is probably not the most 
significant actor in this process—but its role has been a necessary one. 
In laying out this argument, I begin with a brief discussion of problems 
of definition. I follow with a discussion of the UN’s role in furthering human 
security. Then I address a number of shortcomings of the UN that have had an 
effect on establishing the concept of human security and the human security 
agenda in international relations.
Definitions
The first question arising is what we mean by the United Nations. Referring to the 
UN as an actor in world politics is a shortcut that masks a complex institutional 
reality. The UN is a rather loose collection of more or less independent 
organizations with a wide array of responsibilities. Some, such as the General 
Assembly and the Security Council, are intergovernmental and deliberative. 
These two UN organs have quite different legal personalities and powers. The 
Assembly, comprising representatives of all member states, provides a forum 
for debate and, sometimes, consensus building. Its decisions are not binding, 
although some would say they provide a basis for soft law. Its remit is very broad. 
The Council comprises 15 members, five of whom are permanent and possess 
the power to veto resolutions before the body. Its remit is generally limited to 
international peace and security. Its decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter 
are legally binding. The Council has the authority to mandate the use of force 
by the UN, and to approve actions by regional organizations, or by states and 
coalitions of states, to address threats to peace and security.  
These two UN organs are joined by numerous agencies that have operational 
responsibility in specific policy areas (e.g., UNICEF for children, UNESCO for 
culture and education, UNDP for development), staffed by professional civil 
servants, and, in theory anyway, reporting into the UN Secretariat headed by 
the Secretary-General.1 They identify and analyze issues within their functional 
areas, propose and advocate international legislation, develop programmatic 
solutions and implement those solutions. Some have international legal status 
(e.g. UNHCR), but many do not. These agencies may be subordinate to the UN 
Secretariat, or they may be largely independent of it (the IMF, World Bank, and 
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UNHCR). Some rely heavily on state contributions through the UN budget 
process (UNDP). Others (UNICEF and, to an extent, UNHCR) have developed 
substantial autonomous funding streams through the solicitation of private 
donations or through direct donations from states. Many of these institutions and 
their heads have significant agency in their own right. 
In short, when speaking of the “UN role” in human security issues one needs 
to take account of the multiple, and sometimes contradictory, dimensions of the 
UN system. 
Defining human security is also challenging. First, the concept is open 
ended. Security is about the management, mitigation, or removal of threats to the 
core values of a referent institution, group, or individual. If the referent is “human 
beings,” then the agenda could cover anything and everything that might threaten 
human survival, fulfilment or identity and dignity.2 An incomplete list might 
include: disease; water and water quality; access to land, jobs, and education; 
human rights violations; criminality, war, and terrorism; migration (voluntary or 
forced, legal or illegal); the impact of globalization on cultural values; inequality 
and the absence of economic opportunity; resource depletion and climate 
change. In that context, there has been a fair amount of criticism of the allegedly 
boundless breadth of the agenda (see Owen et al. 2004).
Second, there is ambiguity regarding the referent object. Is human security 
about human beings as individuals or about human beings as members of 
collectivities (village, ethnicity, nation, religion, gender, the human species), or 
both? It is hard to demarcate the two; for example, since identity is generally 
defined in reference to a group, it is not clear how one would secure individual 
identity without securing group identity. Likewise, if the individual’s economic 
welfare derives from participation in group economic activities, then securing 
individual welfare depends on securing the welfare of the group. On the other 
hand, the history of nationalism, for example, is replete with examples of nations 
attempting to secure themselves at the expense of the security of dissenting 
individuals within them. 
Third, within the “human security agenda” different people and different 
institutions place their emphasis on different issues. One aspect of this 
phenomenon is a debate on narrow versus broad approaches to human security, 
much of which has played out within UN institutions (see Zaum, Ocampo and 
Eyben 2013, 124-125; compare ICISS 2001 and Commission on Human Security 
2003). One key element of contestation here is the focus on protection from 
violence versus that on empowerment through development. A second is the 
distribution of responsibility between states and international institutions in the 
implementation of human security.3
These disputes reflect not only genuine differences of perspective and 
interpretation, but also the interests of institutions involved in a competition for 
scarce resources. Security is a value-laden concept. To call your issue a security 
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issue enhances its salience in the policy arena; it is seen to be more “important.”
It is not obvious how these questions could be resolved, since the concept of 
security and its human security variant are socially constructed and essentially 
contested (Gallie 1956, 167-198). For the purposes of the analysis that follows, 
I take human security fundamentally to be about recognizing human beings, 
as individuals, to be the principal bearers of rights and, therefore, the central 
focus of security. In this view, states are derivative bearers of rights. States have 
no irreducible claim to security. State security matters insofar as states foster 
and maintain environments in which human beings are physically secure, can 
prosper, and can live in dignity. In other words, the central analytical move is to 
contest traditional conceptions of security that privilege the state as the principal 
referent and to propose that human beings are the ultimate focus of security. 
If there is a shift from states to individuals in conceptualizing and practicing 
security in international relations, this is a major change. It is a substantial 
departure from the normativity and practice of the Westphalian states system, 
which was about states (or sovereigns) and their mutual relations. In that system, 
human rights were considered to be matters essentially of domestic jurisdiction. 
Human security is rooted in a long string of normative and legal developments 
over the past 120 years, and notably, the United Nations Declaration on Human 
Rights and the later Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. In this sense, this reframing of security is part of a much 
larger and sustained movement in international society to make the rights of 
individual human beings and their communities matters of legitimate concern in 
international relations. 
The UN and Human Security
The focus on the security of human beings, individually or in groups, poses an 
immediate problem for the UN. The Charter highlights the essentially inter-
state quality of the organization: Articles 3 and 4 limit membership to states. 
The Charter’s original conception of security is also state-centric. It prohibits the 
aggressive use of force by members and focuses on the control of conflict between 
members (Article 2, and Chapters 6 and 7). Recognizing the equal sovereignty of 
members, the Charter also limits the authority of the UN to involve itself in the 
internal affairs of member states (Article 2.7). Given the statist emphasis of the 
Charter’s treatment of security, one might say that the organization is genetically 
handicapped in its pursuit of human security. 
Nonetheless, and perhaps surprisingly, the organization has played a 
significant role both in redirecting security towards the human referent and 
in embedding human security in international norms and practice. The 
international community and its constituent parts are making slow and uneven 
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progress towards embracing and implementing a human security agenda. The 
UN has made important contributions to the conceptualization, promotion, 
institutionalization, legitimation, and implementation of human security.
Conceptualization and Advocacy of Human Security
United Nations agencies played a key role in the gestation of the idea of human 
security. Although the tensions between the state and human levels of security 
had long been evident in discussions of security (MacFarlane and Khong 2006, 
19-138), the term “human security,” and the underlying multilateral effort to 
reorient analysis and practice of security towards human beings, originated in 
the UN—in the work of Mahbub ul Haq and the UNDP Human Development 
Reports to which he contributed in the early 1990s (UNDP 1994). The 1994 
report initiated the debate on broad versus narrow, and developmental versus 
protective, versions of the concept. It put forward the initial statement of the 
position that human security was fundamentally about human development and 
empowerment, and proposed that the post–Cold War peace dividend be directed 
towards these ends. Although the project to institutionalize this understanding 
at the Copenhagen Social Summit in 1995 was stillborn, this early work had 
substantial influence on the report of the Commission on Human Security, which 
is discussed in more detail below. 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan played a considerable role in generating 
interest in what came to be known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). In 
1999 he noted the sovereignty concerns of member states and their consequent 
discomfort with notions of multilateral intervention on humanitarian grounds, 
as well as the problem of securing multilateral authorization for intrusion into 
domestic jurisdiction. He then asked a simple question in respect to Rwanda and 
Kosovo:
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use of 
force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might ask—not in the context 
of Kosovo—but in the context of Rwanda: If in those dark days and hours leading up 
to the genocide, a coalition of states had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi 
population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition 
have stood aside and let the horror unfold? (UN 1999) 
One result of the ensuing debate was the initiation of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001), whose report 
focused heavily on the protection of civilians from violence, and the role of 
international institutions therein, as key elements of the human security agenda.  
Kofi Annan was also instrumental in initiating the work of the Commission 
on Human Security, which greatly developed Mahbub ul Haq’s exploration of 
the socio-economic dimensions of human security. The report was an ambitious 
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attempt at comprehensiveness in thinking about human security, embracing both 
protection and people-centered development and empowerment (Commission 
on Human Security 2003). 
On other issues related to protection, UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
Sadako Ogata played a key role in highlighting the security vulnerability of 
refugees and displaced persons, not least at the meeting in Lysøen in 1998. 
Relatedly, in 1992 Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed a 
Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons (IDPs), 
Francis Deng. Over the next three years, Deng studied the strengths and 
weaknesses of, and gaps in, existing standards relevant to protection of IDPs. This 
compilation served as the basis for a UNHCR staff field manual for addressing 
IDP issues. On the basis of this work, Deng was encouraged by the General 
Assembly and the UN Human Rights Commission to develop a set of guidelines 
concerning international treatment of IDPs. The guidelines were presented to 
the Human Rights Commission and the Economic and Social Council in 1998 
(Commission on Human Rights 1998). They have since been embraced by a 
growing number of member states of the UN. The story is a good example of the 
expertise and advocacy of a UN official, encouraged by UN structures, producing 
a shift in the normative frame on an issue central to the protection component of 
the human security agenda.
These examples suggest that the UN has played a significant agency role in 
generating the concept and agenda of human security and in framing the debate 
around it. Prominent UN officials in the Secretariat and the specialized agencies 
have also played an important advocacy role in enhancing the profile of central 
human security challenges.
Legitimation and Codification
There are also many examples of the UN’s role in the legitimation, codification, 
and institutionalization of human security. One is the Security Council process 
of deliberation concerning the international protection of civilians in conflict. 
As noted earlier, international enforcement actions to protect civilians at risk 
from conflict are in tension with conventional understandings of sovereignty and 
domestic jurisdiction. Early Security Council authorizations of action within the 
domestic jurisdiction of states (e.g., Somalia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and, belatedly, 
Rwanda) had been ad hoc. Often the enabling resolutions stressed that action in a 
particular case should not be considered as a precedent building towards a general 
rule (MacFarlane and Khong 2006, 164-201). However, in 1999 the President of 
the Security Council issued a statement drawing attention to the protection of 
civilians as a general problem and requesting that the Secretary-General make 
recommendations on how the Council should address it (President of Security 
Council 1999). The Secretary-General’s report generalized the principle that 
systematic violations of human rights or international humanitarian law could 
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constitute threats to international peace and security. It recommended that the 
Council consider enforcement action in the context of intense violations, the 
state’s inability to protect or its complicity in infringements, and when peaceful 
consent-based efforts had been exhausted. 
The Council responded with two resolutions expressing its agreement with 
this potential extension of threats to international peace and security to include 
humanitarian matters. It accepted that, in certain conditions, it would use its 
enforcement powers to protect civilians affected by violence, or humanitarian 
workers denied access to people in need (UN Security Council 1999; 2000). 
The lack of distinction between civil and interstate disputes in the resolutions 
suggested that sovereign rights of states were to a degree conditional upon a state’s 
capacity and will to protect its own population from violence.  
This theme was taken up in the 2005 General Assembly Summit Outcome. 
The document somewhat ambivalently embraced the responsibility to protect 
civilians in conflict. It accepted that, where states could not or would not fulfill 
this responsibility themselves, the United Nations reserved the right to take 
collective action through the Security Council (UN General Assembly 2005, 
pars. 138, 139). Despite its ambivalence, the Summit Outcome was an important 
milestone. The member states of the United Nations collectively embraced the 
proposition that there are circumstances when sovereignty can be overridden by 
a multilateral organization in defence of human beings and their rights within a 
state.  
Looking further at the Lysøen agenda4 reveals a number of other milestones. 
One is the Ottawa Treaty on land mines. The UN played an active advocacy 
role, including statements by the Secretary-General, and the promotional and 
coordinating activities of the UN Department of Humanitarian Assistance 
(UNDHA), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) (Hubert 2000). 
The land mines example exposes another facet of the UN’s human security 
role. The central roles in the process leading to the treaty clearly belonged to 
the International Committee to Ban Land Mines, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, and a small number of state advocates, notably Canada and 
Norway. However, the UN agencies’ embrace of the land mines agenda played a 
significant role in legitimizing and furthering the process of banning them. One 
could also mention such initiatives as the “Optional Protocol to the International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed 
Conflict” concerning child soldiers (UN 2004, 236-241). The conclusion would 
be similar.
Another aspect of the Lysøen agenda was the establishment of individual 
criminality and international means of adjudication of such criminality. The idea 
of an international court to address crimes of war and crimes against humanity 
arose after World War I in the League of Nations and gestated in the UN General 
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Assembly and in the UN’s International Law Commission after the Nuremberg 
Trials. The pace accelerated after the Cold War, not least because of events in 
the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. In both these cases the Security Council 
mandated the creation of courts to adjudicate crimes of genocide and other 
violations of international humanitarian law specific to the situation in question.
The proposal to establish a court of universal jurisdiction came out of 
the work of the International Law Commission in 1994, around the time the 
two particular courts just mentioned were established. The General Assembly 
then agreed to establish a preparatory committee for the establishment of an 
international court. In spite of opposition from a number of major states who 
were reluctant to see their military personnel and other state officials subject to 
the jurisdiction of an international judicial body, the process culminated in the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), adopted on July 17, 
1998, and entering into force on July 1, 2002. The Rome Statute provided for the 
establishment of the Court and defined its remit. Although the ICC sits outside 
the UN system, the role of the UN in its establishment is clear. Concerning 
the UN’s role, the process of negotiation leading to Rome grew out of earlier 
consideration of the problem in UN organs. Moreover, the Statute makes 
provision for the Security Council to refer cases to the ICC.5 
The Rome Statute codifies formal definitions of genocide, crimes of war, and 
crimes against humanity. It establishes an independent international organization 
whose role in law is to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate crimes of this sort 
by individuals. Potential offenders include officials acting under the authority of 
the state in the state’s own domestic jurisdiction. The ICC process amounts to 
a substantial increase in multilateral oversight of state performance where the 
survival and basic rights of human beings are concerned.  However, in a manner 
similar to the Summit Outcome’s embrace of the international Responsibility 
to Protect, the primary responsibility for pursuing cases against individuals 
rests with the state in question. The ICC is a last resort. It cannot act if the state 
of jurisdiction is conducting a “genuine” investigation and prosecution of an 
accused individual. It is to be used in cases where a state is unable or unwilling 
to prosecute through its own judicial processes, or where the process is not 
impartial. 
Taking the Responsibility to Protect, land mines, children in war, and the 
ICC together helps us to understand the role of the UN in promoting human 
security. In some cases UN agencies promoted change directly in throwing 
down challenges for others to pick up. Also, major figures within the UN (the 
Secretaries-General and leaders of UN agencies, such as Sadako Ogata, Francis 
Deng, and James Grant) exercised personal agency. The UN served as a forum for 
advocacy and consensus building. UN agencies were often partners in multilevel 
(NGOs, states, and international organizations) coalitions to further the agenda.
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Implementation 
Taking the distinction between narrow and broad conceptualizations of security 
as a point of departure, this section discusses the trickling down of R2P principles 
into peacekeeping policy and practice, and the pursuit of the human development 
agenda through the Human Security Trust Fund.
Concerning the first issue, during fieldwork in Georgia in the late 1990s 
I interviewed a UN military observer in the security zone between Abkhaz-
controlled and government-controlled territory. There had been a number of 
serious human rights violations in the zone in which he operated. I asked him 
about this. He complained about the demands from local residents for protection 
and assistance. He said that if he and his colleagues responded to such things 
the observer force could not do what it was supposed to do—observe Russian 
and local forces in and around the zone of control and monitor heavy weapons 
storage. It was a good encapsulation of the traditional place of civilian protection 
in peacekeeping mandates. 
It is unlikely one would hear a senior peacekeeping officer say something 
like that today. That change is in part a result of UN efforts to embed civilian 
protection in Security Council deliberations and to translate it into the mandates 
and training of peacekeepers. Since the first inclusion of protection of civilians 
from violence in a force mandate (UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone in 1999-2000), 
the function has become standard for mandates in war or post-war situations. 
Mandates have widened considerably beyond protection to include a raft of other 
issues related to human security. These include gender, human rights, children in 
conflict, de-mining, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of 
combatants (DPKO 2013). The widening of mission mandates has expanded the 
circle of agencies involved. The staffing of peacekeeping missions has broadened 
considerably, with civilian contingents addressing gender, human rights, 
children in conflict, etc. In short, the human security agenda now permeates 
the responsibilities of peacekeeping missions, the staffing of missions, and the 
programs they implement in the field.    
Turning to the developmental aspect of the broader human security agenda, 
as already noted, the UNDP initiated reconceptualization of human development 
as human security. Their effort to embed this notion in UN institutions was 
revived in the 2003 report of the Human Security Commission. One consequence 
of the report was the creation, in 2004, of the Human Security Unit (HSU) in the 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and the transfer 
of administration of the Trust Fund for Human Security (largely funded by 
Japan) to this new unit. The HSU has a broad remit to promote the Commission’s 
vision of human security: protection and empowerment to achieve freedom 
from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. Consistent with the 
seeming bifurcation in the UN’s development of the concept of human security, 
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the protection aspect of HSU activities focuses on prevention and peacebuilding, 
but is silent on the question of intervention/enforcement, and is careful to avoid 
any interrogation of sovereignty (UNOCHA 2013). 
The HSU promotes the idea of human security in the General Assembly, 
responds to situations of human insecurity through project work, develops 
practical tools for the application of the human security framework in the field, 
and disseminates lessons learned from human security activities (see UNTFHS 
2013). It also develops training tools for UN agencies and sponsors regional 
workshops to mainstream human security in the UN system (Human Security 
Unit 2009). 
In short, there is ample evidence within the UN system of trickle-down from 
conceptualization, legitimation, and codification to implementation (practice). 
This involves mandates and staffing of peace operations, revision of training 
practices for peace operations and for human development, and the funding of 
projects informed by the human security agenda.
Limitations on the UN’s Role in Human Security
In these respects, the United Nations has played a substantial role in furthering 
human security. However, the record since the 1990s also displays significant 
shortcomings that limit the effectiveness of the UN in the promotion of the 
human security agenda. A quick glance at the protection agenda is illustrative. 
One key issue is disagreement among the members concerning enforcement 
action to protect civilians in conflict. Many member states of the General 
Assembly and the Security Council are very protective of what they deem to be 
their sovereign rights. 
Where the interests or perspectives of the Security Council’s five permanent 
members are competitively engaged, and when UN security decision-making 
depends on the agreement of the Permanent Five (P5) to put their particular 
preoccupations aside in favour of effective collective action, the UN often finds it 
impossible to act to protect human security.6 The war in Chechnya (1994-1996, 
1999-2005), in which the Russian Federation brutalized the Chechen people, 
provides one example. In the Security Council, there has been no discussion 
of, let alone action with respect to, this conflict. Another was the failure of the 
Council to react meaningfully to the deteriorating situation in Kosovo in 1999. In 
the current context, the failure of the UN to take meaningful enforcement action 
to stop the mass killing of civilians in Syria does not foster optimism about the 
capacity of international law and institutions to protect some people caught up in 
conflict. 
In short, the UN’s mandating of enforcement to protect civilians is sporadic 
and selective, depending as it does on how the P5 perceive their particular 
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interests in the situation at hand. This is particularly evident when the victims 
that need protection are within the domestic jurisdiction of a P5 state (as with 
Chechnya in Russia and Xinjiang in China), or when a perpetrator is closely allied 
with a P5 member (arguably the case with Syria). This is not merely a matter of 
conflicting interest. At least two of the P5 members (China and Russia) are hostile 
to the redefinition of sovereign rights inherent in the Responsibility to Protect, 
because it conflicts with their understanding of states’ rights and international 
law. Several additional problems arise. One is the creation of a double standard. 
The UN acts to enforce when the P5 are willing to mandate it; it does not act 
when the P5 are not willing, or when acting collectively is inconsistent with 
particular interests of a member or members of the “club.” This inconsistency 
impedes wider acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect. As Kofi Annan put it: 
“If the new commitment (sic) to intervention in the face of extreme suffering is 
to retain the support of the world’s peoples, it must be—and must be seen to be—
fairly and consistently applied, irrespective of region or nation” (UN 1999). 
The inconstancy of Security Council response also encourages action 
outside the legal framework of Security Council authorization, as in Kosovo 
in 1999. Concerning consideration of enforcement action in Syria, one author 
noted that President Obama took the view that “taking limited military action in 
Syria was the right choice even without the support of the UN Security Council, 
which he [Obama] said was ‘completely paralysed and unwilling to hold Assad 
accountable’” (Lewis 2013, 2). Precedents thus created may weaken the fabric of 
international law concerning the use of force. Finally, the legitimation (through 
appeal to R2P or other human rights principles) of the practice of intervention 
may be used to justify aggression, as occurred in Iraq in 2003, Georgia in 2008, 
and Ukraine in 2014. 
It is hard to see how the Council, as currently constituted, could reliably 
enforce the Responsibility to Protect; there is no reason to believe that the 
P5 would, as a group, sacrifice their particular interests in order to pursue 
universal protection. On the other hand, it is hard to see how the Council could 
be reformed in order to be able to do so. It is improbable that the P5 would 
surrender their veto privilege. It is not obvious that any alternative construction 
of the Security Council would be better from the perspective of the protection of 
human beings.  
Turning to the General Assembly, the tension mentioned above between the 
rights and protection agenda on the one hand, and the conservative conception 
of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention on the other, is evident 
in the 2005 Summit Outcome Document. Proponents of the Responsibility to 
Protect cite the document as evidence of endorsement of the principle by the 
international community. And so it is. 
But the devil lies in the details. In the brief section of the document 
addressing protection, Paragraph 138 restates the primacy of the state in 
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addressing human protection issues within its territory. Paragraph 139 states that 
the UN may consider action through the Security Council under Chapters VI 
and VII of the Charter on a case-by-case basis when national governments fail 
to protect their populations from genocide, crimes of war, and crimes against 
humanity (UN General Assembly 2005). Given widely different perspectives in 
the General Assembly and the Security Council on the derogation of sovereignty 
on human rights grounds, one can easily see how defining the threshold between 
138 and 139 would be a highly contentious political issue. The fundamental 
problem is that, at both the Security Council and the General Assembly, the 
Responsibility to Protect cuts across the perceptions and policies of many 
member states. There is no consensus on how to implement this principle. It is 
unavoidable, therefore, that it should be incompletely and unevenly applied.
In practice, where the UN does apply the principle the enhancement of 
human security is sometimes hard to find on the ground. One example would 
be a recent Save the Children report that established that the worst place in the 
world to be an expectant mother was the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
(Save the Children 2013, 9). The DRC hosts a UN security presence (MONUSCO) 
with 23,407 personnel, the second largest current peacekeeping operation. There 
have also been a number of cases in which, far from protecting civilians, some 
peacekeepers have themselves been a hazard to the security of human beings, for 
example, in the form of sexual abuse of women and girls (see Defeis 2008).
Concerning codification of aspects of the human security agenda, it 
bears mentioning that many of the key treaties and conventions have not been 
universally accepted. The Rome Statute aims to end impunity with regard to 
crimes of war and crimes against humanity. However, many states, such as China, 
have not signed the treaty and do not accept the ICC’s jurisdiction. Others, such 
as Russia, have signed but have not ratified the treaty and hence are not members. 
Still others (Israel, Sudan, the United States) signed the treaty, but have indicated 
subsequently that they have no intention to proceed to ratification. 
Despite the ambitions of the ICC, and its impressive organization, its effects 
in ending impunity have been modest. Since its establishment in 2002, eight 
situations have been brought to the Court. The Security Council referred two of 
the eight situations (Darfur and Libya), four were self-referrals, and two were 
brought to the attention of the Court by the prosecutor, acting proprio motu (on 
his own initiative). Investigations of these situations have produced 18 cases. The 
numbers are somewhat deceptive in terms of the large agenda of ending impunity, 
since such situations and cases are to be handled by the states of jurisdiction in 
the first instance. The ICC is a last resort. Even so, there are numerous situations 
(the most obvious being Syria) where neither national judicial procedures nor 
ICC procedures have been activated to deal with, or have been effective in dealing 
with, crimes against humanity.
All eight situations currently under active consideration by the ICC are in 
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African countries. The Court is also considering taking up issues in Afghanistan, 
Colombia, Georgia, Guinea, and Honduras. This list of 13 contributes to the 
perception against which Kofi Annan warned: If the protection agenda is not—
and is not seen to be—impartial and universal, it will be perceived as a selective 
vehicle for the imposition of Western values on southern states and societies.7
With regard to codification of other elements of the human security agenda, 
three out of five permanent members of the Security Council (China, Russia, and 
the United States) have not signed the Land Mines Treaty. The Optional Protocol 
on Child Soldiers has been accepted more widely, but the forced recruitment of 
children into combat units continues. UN and related efforts at demobilization 
and reintegration of child soldiers in ongoing conflicts, such as that in the DRC, 
frequently have disappointing results. 
The broader definition of human security pursued by the HSU and the Trust 
Fund for Human Security encounters far less political and cultural resistance. 
The HSU claims a practical role in protection and empowerment of individuals 
and communities. It has funded a wide array of projects proposed by other UN 
agencies.8 Projects implemented follow closely the protection/empowerment 
logic. Major issues addressed include health and disease prevention, disaster 
preparedness, restoring or enhancing rural livelihoods, community development, 
post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation, human trafficking, and 
community violence. Vulnerable populations are a particular focus among 
beneficiaries: children and youth, women and girls, displaced or migrant 
populations, and populations affected by conflict. Review of allocation suggests 
a particular concentration of resources in societies in conflict or post-conflict 
situations. Current grant guidance suggests single organization projects should 
budget around one million U.S. dollars per project, and groups of organizations 
should aim at $2.5 million. Historically, project grants have ranged between 
$100,000 and $20 million, but most have fallen between $1 and $5 million. Total 
funds allocated since the inception of grant activities come to roughly $230 
million.9
This is not a lot of money in contrast to the total size of national official 
development assistance (ODA) budgets, the total spent in conflict management 
and post-conflict programming, or the total annual ODA of all OECD members. 
However, the purpose of these programs is to act as pilots for the dissemination 
of the “human security approach” into aid programming more broadly. It is 
difficult to assess the extent to which this has been successful. However, there is 
no reason to doubt that the impact of these projects on beneficiaries is positive. 
On the other hand, the fact that the focus is on pilot projects in the hope that the 
approach will be emulated in programs mounted by other multilateral, national, 
and nongovernmental donors and organizations underscores the limits on the 
role of the UN per se in implementing a broad human security agenda, as well as 
the continuing reliance on major states to provide the bulk of resources.
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In other words, although much progress has been made in implementing 
elements of the human security and rights agenda, there remains considerable 
distance to go. Many aspects of the UN’s agenda face resistance at many levels, 
not least that of key states or groups of states. The rhetoric is often far ahead of 
the practice. The ambition outstrips the resources available to pursue it.
Conclusion
The 15-year period since the Lysøen Declaration has witnessed substantial 
progress in embedding human security in international relations. In essence, the 
emergence of the concept of human security reflects a fundamental change in 
the way we understand international relations and international security. That 
change speaks to the rights of human beings in a system traditionally dominated 
by states. Human security emphasizes the rights of people to live free from fear 
and the duty of the international community to address this challenge when 
states cannot or will not do so. It makes states and their leaders and officials 
internationally accountable for their treatment of their own citizens, what 
Kathryn Sikkink referred to in a recent book as the “justice cascade” (Sikkink 
2011). It also highlights the rights of individuals and communities to have control 
over their own lives and to live in dignity (i.e., empowerment). 
The United Nations has played a significant role in conceptualizing human 
security, and in promoting it. It has also provided a forum for building a 
modicum of consensus around the humanization of security. Much of the work 
on legitimizing and, in some cases, codifying and institutionalizing this agenda 
has occurred within the United Nations system. The United Nations has been 
instrumental in embedding aspects of human security in both security and 
development practice.
That the United Nations sought to pursue this agenda is a product of 
individual agency and leadership within the organization. However, institutional 
engagement has often been the result of advocacy by member states and by 
international civil society. Successes in codification and legitimation have 
occurred in considerable measure because states have supported the process. 
States have engaged in the promotion of human security in part because 
of pressure from national and international civil society. To the extent that 
normative change has occurred, it has frequently been achieved as a result of the 
initiative of like-minded states and NGOs, partnerships among them, as well as 
partnerships between them and those units of the UN System sympathetic to 
these projects. Perhaps the most important role of the organization has been to 
provide a structure in which a revision of the discourse of appropriateness related 
to security can evolve in a human direction.
When we think about the causes of normative change we are often 
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overwhelmed by the problem of over-determination and the conjuncture of 
multiple causes. It is very difficult to determine what the role of a particular 
institution or cluster of institutions might be in complex change. However, 
counterfactual analysis may help. Civil society, like-minded states, and particular 
individuals have acted as norm entrepreneurs. However modest the progress 
that has been made in embedding human security in the norms and practice of 
international society, nothing or little would have occurred without these sets 
of actors. On the other hand, it is hard to conceive of this modest flourishing of 
the human security agenda without the UN playing the roles described above. 
Not least, it has provided a near-universal forum in which these questions can be 
argued out, and in which agreed conclusions receive the legitimation associated 
with broad consensus. 
In other words, both sides of the human security partnership have been 
necessary conditions for forward movement. But neither has been sufficient. The 
Syrian case suggests clearly that international society has not fully established the 
fundamental principles of human security. And human security practice is far 
from reliable when it comes to consistent enforcement and implementation, in 
considerable measure because of the resistance or indifference of states, including 
major state actors.
However, systemic normative change generally occurs slowly, with numerous 
hiccups and reversals. A shift from the state referent as the focus of security to 
the human referent was certain to encounter significant resistance from states 
unwilling to surrender their prerogatives. State resistance has been a significant 
brake on establishing human security. Given that the UN is, at the end of the day, 
an organization of states, it is no surprise that state resistance has circumscribed 
the UN role in human security. Indeed, given its origins and makeup, it is a 
surprise that it has contributed as much as it has.
Notes
1. Inis Claude referred in this context to the two UNs: the intergovernmental arena 
and a professional secretariat (Claude 1956; 1996). In the 2000s, some scholars proposed 
consideration of a “third” UN, comprising NGOs and networks of experts and advocates 
with close ties to UN organizations (Weiss, Carayannis, and Jolly 2009). This proposition is 
not directly addressed here, but is implicit in the discussion of interaction between the UN 
and other entities later in this paper. 
2. This breadth is clear in the report of the Commission on Human Security (2003, 
4), which described the essence of human security as the creation of “political, social, 
environmental, economic, military, and cultural systems that together give people the 
building blocks of survival, livelihood, and dignity.” 
3. The 2012 effort by the General Assembly to arrive at a consensus on defining human 
security is an interesting document in this regard, not least in its distinction between 
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human security and the Responsibility to Protect, the focus on state sovereignty and non-
intervention, empowerment through development, and the remark that “human security 
does not entail the threat or use of force or coercive measures” (UN General Assembly 
2012).
4. The Chairman’s Summary of the Lysøen Conference on Human Security (Lysøen 
Conference 1998) lists several elements of a practical human security agenda: anti-
personnel landmines, small arms, children in armed conflict, international humanitarian 
and human rights law, the international criminal court, worker safety, conflict prevention, 
transnational crime, and resources for development. 
5. States can also refer cases concerning individuals under their jurisdiction. Individuals 
and organizations other than states can provide information that may subsequently lead to 
prosecutorial investigation proprio motu (on his own initiative). For general background, 
see ICC 2013. 
6. One Russian analyst, in explaining Russia’s obstruction of international action in 
Syria, noted that “for Putin, Syria was above all about the principles of sovereignty and 
non-interference” (Trenin 2013).  
7. This perception is one factor underlying the African Union’s announcement that its 
members would not cooperate with the Court on the case against Sudan’s President Omar 
Bashir. See also Paul Kagamé’s remark that the ICC “has been put in place only for African 
countries, only for poor countries,” and Richard Goldstone’s observation that the ICC 
“appeared too focused on crimes on the continent of Africa, while paying scant regard to 
similar situations elsewhere in the world,” as quoted in Kimani 2009. For background, see 
Tladi (2009, 58): “From a more normative perspective, the decision raises questions about 
the reality of a new value-based international law, centered on the protection of humanity 
and human rights and whether such a new international law can escape accusations of neo-
imperialism.”     
8. For the Trust Fund guidelines, see UNOCHA 2012.
9. This figure is derived from the budget envelopes of projects listed in UNTFHS 2013b.
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